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A is for Animal: 
The Animal User’s Lexicon
ABSTRACT
In Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass, Humpty Dumpty ex-
plains to Alice, “When I use a word … it means just what I choose it 
to mean — neither more nor less.” When Alice questions this license, 
Humpty Dumpty replies, “The question is … which is to be master 
— that’s all.” The present article offers a lexicon of words that are 
used by human beings, however unintentionally or ingenuously, to 
maintain their mastery or prerogatives over other animals. A moti-
vating assumption of the article is that putting on display the verbal 
menagerie in animal agriculture, animal experimentation, and the 
rest of the industries and institutions that use nonhuman animals, 
could go a long way toward eliminating these enterprises, since they 
are built as much on equivocation as on exploitation.
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“A” is for “animal,” but what is an animal? Perhaps not sur-
prisingly this word/concept is the first casualty of tendentious 
definition in the animal user’s lexicon. Examining the U.S. 
government’s Animal Welfare Act, for instance, we learn that:
Animal means any live or dead dog, cat, nonhuman 
primate, guinea pig, hamster, rabbit, or any other 
warm-blooded animal, which is being used, or is in-
tended for use for research, teaching, testing, experi-
mentation, or exhibition purposes, or as a pet. This 
term excludes birds, rats of the genus Rattus and mice 
of the genus Mus, bred for use in research [in other 
words, an estimated 95 percent of the animals used in 
biomedical research (Leary and Schaeffer 2011; Smith 
2002)]; horses not used for research purposes; and oth-
er farm animals, such as, but not limited to, livestock 
or poultry used or intended for use as food or fiber, or 
livestock or poultry used or intended for use for im-
proving animal nutrition, breeding, management, or 
production efficiency, or for improving the quality of 
food or fiber. (§2132 (g); my comment in brackets)
Thus, according to this definition, almost all animals, in-
cluding by implication all animals in the wild, are not animals. 
This naturally reduces the burden of “animal welfare” signifi-
cantly! There are numerous regulations that pick up some of the 
slack, so that additional animals do receive some measure of 
protection in enterprises that receive federal funding (Latham 
2012). Nevertheless, the Animal Welfare Act sets the tone for 
animal welfare in this country; and as we shall see, when one 
considers the definition of “welfare” in the same context, the 
burden is reduced even more.
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Of course it is not a novel observation that an everyday term 
can be appropriated for special usage in a misleading way. We 
even have a term for this kind of use of terms: “Orwellian.” 
George Orwell himself called it “Newspeak” in his 1949 novel, 
1984, wherein the governing authorities assert that “War Is 
Peace” and “Freedom Is Slavery.” That was preceded by Lewis 
Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass (1871), in which Humpty 
Dumpty puts the point succinctly: “When I use a word … it 
means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.” 
When Alice questions this license, Humpty Dumpty replies, 
“The question is … which is to be master — that’s all.” And 
even millennia before this, it was stressed by Confucius that 
language can diverge from reality, in his view to the detriment 
of society – hence his emphasis on the “rectification of names.”
Therefore in this essay I need not take up the general is-
sue of whether language can be perverted from its presumed 
primary function in order to achieve the opposite, namely, in-
hibiting communication and understanding. Instead I will cut 
to the chase and offer a kind of Devil’s Dictionary (taking the 
cue from Ambrose Bierce) of words used by the users of ani-
mals to disguise, however unintentionally or ingenuously, what 
they – the words and the users – are about. There is no limit to 
this practice, and I could easily turn this inventory into a book. 
But highlighting the following sample should suffice to equip 
the reader with suitable skepticism to continue the compila-
tion on your own. You may also refer to earlier efforts along 
these lines, such as Davis (2014), Glossary (2012), McWilliams 
(2012), and especially Croney and Reynnells (2008). I have also 
recently learned that the writer Jonathan Safran Foer compiled 
a glossary of a similar nature in his investigative memoir, Eat-
ing Animals (New York: Little, Brown, 2009). It is my belief, 
or perhaps faith – and also my fond hope –that a thorough rec-
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tification of the names of the verbal menagerie in animal agri-
culture, animal experimentation, and the rest of the industries 
and institutions that use nonhuman animals, would go a long 
way toward eliminating these enterprises, since they are built 
as much on equivocation as on exploitation. 
The Lexicon
Abuse. (1) This term is used by animal users, as well as laws 
that sanction the use of animals, to indicate treatment of ani-
mals that is cruel and not a part of standard practice in one 
or another animal industry. Thus, in response to the release 
of an undercover video by the animal advocacy group Com-
passion Over Killing showing “cows that appeared to be sick 
or lame being beaten, kicked, shot and shocked in an attempt 
to get them to walk to slaughter,” Dave Daley, a professor at 
California State University, Chico, is reported by Cone (2012) 
to have said on behalf of the National Cattlemen’s Beef Asso-
ciation: “We firmly believe that those knowingly and willfully 
committing any abuse to animals should not be in the business 
— period.” Meanwhile, the slaughter of the animals and the 
ordinary conditions of their rearing, including being “branded 
and castrated without painkillers [and] fed an unnatural grain 
diet that is very hard on their bodies, causing illness, pain” 
(ASPCA 2014), do not count as abuse. (2) Another usage refers 
to treatment that may be cruel but is believed to serve a signifi-
cant human purpose. For example, in an AP article about the 
new trend in personalized medicine to buy one’s own animal 
testing, one cancer patient is quoted: “Animal abuse? I don’t 
look at it that way. It’s not testing cosmetics. It’s trying to save 
my life” (Marchione 2014). (An added wrinkle is that there is 
no guarantee that the testing is valid.) It is fitting that “abuse” 
is the first entry in the animal user’s lexicon, as a fundamental 
tenet of the animal rights movement is that all use of nonhuman 
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animals is, or inevitably leads to, abuse, due to the power im-
balance between humans and animals (see e.g. Hall 2010). This 
would distinguish animal ethics from human ethics, which 
contains a clear demarcation between use and abuse (Marks 
2008).
Aesthetics. The American Veterinary Medical Association 
(AVMA) uses this term to refer to the response that might be 
expected of laypersons, and even professionals, who witnessed 
certain practices that veterinarians are supposed to consider 
acceptable or even recommended, yet to the layperson, I imag-
ine, might be considered morally outrageous. For example, the 
AVMA Guidelines for the Euthanasia of Animals deems as “ac-
ceptable with conditions” the following “methods” for “eutha-
nizing” free-ranging marine animals – “gunshot,” “manually 
applied blunt force trauma,” and “implosive decerebration” – 
but cautions that they may “fail to meet aesthetic or other con-
ventional standards” (AVMA 2013, 83-84).
Alternatives. In reputable animal experimentation there is 
the expectation that “alternatives” will be used whenever pos-
sible. However, the term’s plain meaning – that alternatives to 
animals are being used – has become lost among a host of loop-
holes (Marks 2012). The most prominent loophole is the use 
of animals that are “lower”; for example, there is this authori-
tative pronouncement from Essentials for Animal Research: 
A Primer for Research Personnel: “Any model system which 
moves down the phylogenetic scale from the generally accept-
able animal model will be considered an alternative” (Bennett 
1994). However, not only is this a bait-and-switch use of the 
term “alternative,” but it also misrepresents biological under-
standing since Darwin, who wrote, “It is absurd to talk of one 
animal being higher than another” (from Darwin’s B notebook 
Joel Marks
7
© Between the Species, 2015
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 18, Issue 1
of 1838, as quoted by Costa 2009, 336). Indeed, the very term 
“phylogenetic scale” conflates opposing views of evolution, 
since “The Scale of Nature model assumes a hierarchy of lower 
and higher organisms, while the Phylogenetic model does not” 
(Rosenberger 2004, Figure 3). Note: The term “replacement” 
has been subject to the same ambiguity, since there can be so-
called partial replacement as well as full replacement of ani-
mals in biomedical research. Incidentally, in the lab world, the 
“lower” animals tend to be smaller and hence less expensive 
and so used with greater profligacy.
Animal. (1) As noted in the first paragraph, the federal gov-
ernment’s primary legislation governing animal welfare does 
not recognize the vast majority of animals used for food, re-
search, and sport, nor under the jurisdiction of wilderness man-
agers, as animals. The primary intended beneficiaries of the 
Animal Welfare Act were probably the animals that Americans 
view as pets. This usage has also been adopted by pet own-
ers who “love animals” and yet give no thought to becoming 
vegetarian, etc. (cf. CHICKEN). (2) It is worth noting also that 
the word “animal” is almost always used to denote nonhuman 
animals, thereby establishing an artificial boundary between 
our species and every other animal species on Earth, as if to 
mean: They are animals, but we are not. This usage, while false 
biologically, is nevertheless so commonplace that it is difficult 
for even animal advocates to avoid it (as in the term “animal 
advocates”!). However. sometimes animal advocates are able 
to finesse this issue by implicitly including human beings in the 
scope of “animal,” as when we urge the non-eating of animals.
Anthropomorphize. This term has the straightforward de-
notation of attributing human attributes to something that is 
not human, but it also has the connotation that the attribu-
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tion is inappropriate. (This is analogous to how the verb “lie” 
straightforwardly describes the act of saying something that 
the speaker believes to be false for the purpose of misleading 
someone else into believing it is true, but also typically implies 
disapproval of that act.) However, animal users often invoke 
the word/notion to deny not only uniquely human characteris-
tics to other animals, but also characteristics that we share as 
animals (or as some type of animals, for example, mammals). 
Thus, it has long been standard “scientific” practice to disallow 
the literal attribution of emotions to other animals. This is of 
course absurd (Bekoff 2007, 5); yet it is the view among some 
“experts,” and it does help to “justify” treating other animals as 
mere things for various human purposes. While it may certain-
ly be true that human emotions are distinctive in some ways, it 
hardly follows that other animals do not have emotions, which 
may also be distinctive to wolves, cows, chickens, octopuses, 
salmon, etc., or that we cannot empathize with them qua fellow 
animals (cf. Acampora 2006).
Cattle. This word, commonly used to refer to cows, bulls, 
steers and heifers, has a storied derivation, coming from the 
same root as “chattel” (slave) and “capital” (business wealth). 
The sense, then, is that the animals referred to are being identi-
fied first and foremost as property. Nibert (2013) tells the ex-
traordinary, and horrific story of the “domesecration” of these 
animals in human history. Analogous labeling serves to remove 
from our verbal consciousness the animality, sentience, and 
personhood of other beings we eat and exploit; cf. CHICKEN.
Chicken. This word can of course pick out an individual of 
the species. But for animal users it has also come to be used as 
a mass noun, to refer to the animal qua food. By this deft ma-
neuver a person who has no regard for chickens can neverthe-
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less “love chicken.” (This person might even consider herself 
to be an “animal lover” because she loves dogs and cats; cf. 
ANIMAL.) The same goes for “fish,” “lamb,” etc. But chickens 
are, by number and perhaps as well by living conditions, the 
most abused animals on Earth (Davis 2009). Wolfson and Sul-
livan (2004) comment that “From a statistician’s point of view, 
since farmed animals represent 98 percent of all animals (even 
including companion animals and animals in zoos and circuses 
[and, they say elsewhere, animals killed in research, testing, 
dissection, fur production, hunting, and pounds]) with whom 
humans interact in the United States, all animals are farmed 
animals; the number that are not is statistically insignificant” 
(206). They might just as well have said that all animals are 
chickens since, by their own tally (226-27), among farmed ani-
mals, chickens constitute the overwhelming bulk (8.4 billion 
out of 8.9 billion in the U.S. alone in 2002, albeit not counting 
marine animals). So it becomes especially imperative to the 
animal user to mask their nature as fellow sentient beings.
Cull. A euphemism for killing animals (for the purpose of 
thinning herds for some humanly-conceived notion of ecologi-
cal aptness or for human safety, commonly coincident with the 
desires of hunters). Cf.  HARVEST.
Death. The meaning is obvious, but the conception of ani-
mal death among animal users is often peculiar. The peculiar-
ity is that animal death, unlike human death, is supposed to 
have no significance for the welfare of the animal … other than 
as a pain-reliever. Thus: “In public policy, pain counts for ev-
erything. Animal death is only significant in its relationship 
to pain. Animal euthanasia [sic; see EUTHANASIA] appears 
only twice in the 1985 amended Animal Welfare Act, both 
times as a prescription, along with anesthetics and analgesics, 
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for pain relief” and “there is no evident sense in any of these 
public policies that killing healthy, pain-free animals is itself to 
be avoided” (Carbone 2004, 190). A reason often given is that 
nonhuman animals have no conception of their life continuing 
and hence can make no plans in which they could have any 
kind of personal stake; hence death means nothing to them. 
Surprisingly this argument comes from Peter Singer, who is a 
champion of not using animals. But he has stated, “Humans are 
forward-looking beings, and they have hopes and desires for the 
future. That seems a plausible answer to the question of why 
it’s so tragic when humans [as opposed to chickens or mice; but 
see WELFARE for a rebuttal] die” (Singer 2009; my comment 
in brackets). (Singer does, however, qualify this statement else-
where: “I am not saying whether this view is justifiable or not; 
only that it cannot simply be rejected as speciesist, because it is 
not on the basis of species itself that one life is held to be more 
valuable than another [but rather the forward-looking capacity, 
which could be lacking in a human being too]” (Singer 1979, 
chap. 3; my comment in brackets).) Essentially, on this concep-
tion, animals “live in the Now.” Ironically this is sometimes 
conceived as a high human aspiration, for example, in Zen 
Buddhist philosophy; yet it would seem odd to discount human 
longevity on that account. Meanwhile, the animal user’s failure 
of attribution of forward-thinking to other animals may simply 
be factually in error (cf. ANTHROPOMORPHISM) and is in 
any case suspiciously self-serving, since the vast majority of 
animal use involves killing the animals, usually in their youth 
(Patrick-Goudreau 2014). See also EUTHANASIA and WEL-
FARE.
Euthanasia. This term is ubiquitous in the literature of ani-
mal use, yet its implied meaning therein is odd, to put it mildly, 
and in two respects. The literal meaning is an “easy death,” and 
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no doubt animal users have that in mind when using the word. 
Yet the first oddity is that “easy” in the animal use context is 
inherently relative, and what counts as such would be quite sur-
prising to the layperson. A perusal of the American Veterinary 
Medical Association’s compendium on the subject (AVMC 
2013) is truly an eye-opener (cf. AESTHETICS above). It be-
comes clear that the notion is qualified by economic, scientific, 
and standard-practice considerations. The second oddity of eu-
thanasia’s meaning in animal use is that, even when genuinely 
“easy,” the death in question may fail to satisfy the further con-
notation, and perhaps even denotation, that the death is desired 
by the person or being to whom it is being provided. Further-
more, on the everyday acceptation of the term, the reason the 
death is desired is not simply that the person or being is in some 
terrible pain and already suffering from some terminal condi-
tion, but also that the person or institution that is providing the 
service is not itself the cause of that pain or terminal condition. 
Thus, for example, it would be strange indeed to refer to capi-
tal punishment by means of painless drugs as euthanasia, even 
though every effort may have gone into making this an “easy 
death,” since the further conditions – of the person desiring the 
death and its not being imposed by the very institution that is 
ameliorating it – are not met. Similarly, it would be downright 
bizarre to refer to the gassing of concentration camp inmates in 
Nazi Germany as euthanasia, even if pains were taken to make 
this the “easiest” death possible under the circumstances (for 
example, by telling the victims they were headed for the show-
ers), for, again, those two further conditions were not being 
met. Yet in the case of, say, animals killed in the biomedical 
research laboratory we are told time and again that they are 
undergoing euthanasia … even though the same two conditions 
are not being met (or at least the condition of the euthanizer not 
being also the party responsible for the occasion of it, since by 
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this time animals who have undergone certain experiments or 
animals who have been bred for experiments may indeed de-
sire nothing more than to die). In a word, the animal user’s use 
of “euthanasia” slyly restricts the concept to the means while 
ignoring the ends. Cf. Beck (1993) and see also DEATH and 
WELFARE.
Harvest. A euphemism for killing animals (for some human 
use of this “resource”). Cf. CULL.
Health. There are various occupations and initiatives that 
are concerned with the health of nonhuman animals, including 
animal health, One Health, and of course veterinary medicine. 
Yet, contrary, and indeed perversely so, to lay intuition and 
plain meaning, health in all of these contexts is often subsumed 
under a contradictory rubric, namely, exploitation. Thus, it is 
imperative to keep farm animals healthy, but not for their sake: 
rather for the sake of the farmer’s profits and the consumer’s 
health. For example, Cooper (2011) reports on a new effort to 
develop more effective vaccines against “an infectious bronchi-
tis virus (IBV) that is the biggest single cause of economic loss 
in the U.S. poultry industry. …IBV restricts growth in broiler 
chickens and reduces egg production in those that are laying. 
Like most bronchial diseases, it spreads rapidly in the dense 
living conditions found on most commercial poultry farms.” 
So the goal is to keep the animals “healthy” so that they can 
continue to live under the most miserable and disease-inducing 
conditions imaginable (and then be slaughtered). Similarly, it is 
imperative to keep lab animals healthy, the better to have them 
available for experimentation. Here the notion of “healthy” is 
especially straitened since the animals may otherwise be in-
duced, by breeding or surgery or drug or pathogen administra-
tion, to be sick! As with EUTHANASIA (q.v.), then, context 
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is critical for maintaining a full appreciation of the concept in 
question; just as “euthanasia” seems inappropriate for a death 
not desired by the subject, so “health” seems inappropriate for 
a condition that conduces to the subject’s injury and destruc-
tion. See also WELFARE and VALUE.
Humane. Seemingly a term of approbation, there is irony 
in the very concept, since a cold-eyed comparison of the way 
human beings treat one another and the way other species – the 
“beasts” – treat their own would hardly be flattering to ours. 
But this internal irony is quite eclipsed by the term’s use by 
animal users, for they label all of the cruelty and death that 
are routinely inflicted on the tens and hundreds of billions of 
nonhuman animals by humans year after year as … humane! 
How is this possible? “Humaneness” has come to be defined in 
terms of various guidelines that themselves incorporate a rela-
tivity to possibility and necessity, which concepts in turn have 
been defined by various animal-user interest groups. Thus, in 
the animal lab, “humane” means that an experimental protocol 
has been vetted for its scientific cogency and found to neces-
sitate a given use of animals (see Francione 2007 for a criti-
cal discussion of “necessity” in the animal lab setting.); in this 
way, almost any degree of distress imposed on an animal – not 
to mention, her almost inevitable DEATH (q.v.) by guillotine 
(Carbone 2004, chap. 9) or other means – can be justified as hu-
mane if it is not possible to carry out the experiment otherwise 
(Marks 2011c). So there is this from the Animal Welfare Act:
… the withholding of tranquilizers, anesthesia, anal-
gesia, or euthanasia [sic] when scientifically necessary 
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And here are some examples (from Linden 2007, and previ-
ously cited in Marks 2011a) of actual experiments that presum-
ably passed the necessity test for humaneness:
So what role does neuronal activity play in wiring up 
the brain? . . . first, we’ll consider a mutant mouse cre-
ated in the laboratory. . . . It turns out that, ultimately, 
this mouse is a disaster: it dies at birth because it can-
not control the muscles used for breathing. (70)
The standard lab cage is deadly boring: for the rat it’s 
like being in solitary confinement. (77)
Similar phenomena have been observed in laboratory 
monkeys that have sustained [presumably by surgical 
intervention] bilateral damage to the temporal lobe: 
they may try to eat grossly inappropriate nonfood items 
(such as a lit cigarette). (88; my comment in brackets)
Most interestingly, subjecting a mother rat during 
pregnancy to moderate stress (confinement in a clear 
plastic tube under bright lights) can reduce the levels of 
testosterone in the developing fetus. (181)
A grisly set of experiments with rats showed that total 
sleep deprivation will cause death in 3–4 weeks. (186)
So to speak, then, it is not the dog of non-cruelty that wags 
the tail of what constitutes humane treatment, but rather the tail 
of “scientific necessity” that wags the dog of what constitutes 
humane treatment. Furthermore, the “scientific” character of 
what is necessary or possible also likely involves calculations 
of monetary cost. This could be especially relevant to the liv-
ing conditions or “husbandry” of the animals outside of the 
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strictly experimental setting; see, e.g., Chapter 5 of Carbone 
(2004) for a critical discussion of the “science” that went into 
determining acceptable cage sizes for laboratory animals. See 
also WELFARE.
Model. In animal experimentation, an individual animal 
who has lost his or her identity as a living being by being trans-
formed, by both language and physical intervention, such as 
breeding or surgery, into a stand-in for some human organic 
system or disease. Thus for example:
When animal models are employed in the study of hu-
man disease, they are frequently selected because of 
their similarity to humans in terms of genetics, anat-
omy, and physiology. Also, animal models are often 
preferable for experimental disease research because 
of their unlimited supply and ease of manipulation. … 
Despite their genomic similarities to humans, most 
model organisms typically do not contract the same 
genetic diseases as people, so scientists must alter their 
genomes to induce human disease states. (Simmons 
2008)
The underlying rationale is self-contradictory; for on the one 
hand, the type of animals chosen relies on their similarity to 
human beings, whereas on the other hand, their being chosen 
depends precisely on their not being human beings.
Necessary. See HUMANE.
Replacements. See ALTERNATIVES.
Sacrifice. This term has undergone an interesting full-circle 
in the history of its usage. We may imagine that in the begin-
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ning there was animal sacrifice (including human animals) to 
the gods, suggesting that the subject of sacrifice is another. In 
other words, the agent of sacrifice performs it, but is not her-
self making any sacrifice, all the less being sacrificed. (Strictly 
speaking, no one is making a sacrifice, since we do not nor-
mally suppose that the animal in animal sacrifice is offering 
himself up voluntarily.) Indeed, the sacrifice is presumably for 
the sake of the agent and others, propitiating the gods for hu-
man benefit. By the time Jesus comes along, however, “sacri-
fice” has taken on the more modern meaning of the agent of 
sacrifice being the one who is making a sacrifice. Presumably 
Jesus rendered up himself for sacrifice in the sense of giving up 
something of value to himself (his very life in this case). This 
is also the natural sense of “sacrifice” in everyday language, as 
when one sacrifices for the sake of one’s children … or even 
sacrifices one’s own enjoyment of ice cream sundaes albeit for 
one’s own sake (to lose weight). But with the advent of bio-
medical experimentation on animals, “sacrifice” has returned 
to its roots in animal sacrifice; for now once again the agent of 
the sacrifice is not being sacrificed nor even making a sacrifice 
but is instead sacrificing another, and usually for presumed hu-
man benefit. Only the gods have been omitted; animal experi-
mentation is animal sacrifice without the “making sacred” (the 
word’s literal meaning; I suppose a religious person might even 
call this use of God’s creatures a desecration). Thus this typical 
statement by a medical researcher: “I fundamentally believe 
that relieving human suffering or disease of children is worth 
the sacrifice of mouse lives” (Distler 2009, quoting Yale Prof. 
Marina Picciotto).  I submit that statements like this tend to 
bring along the everyday connotation of willingness and active 
participation by the animal who is being sacrificed, thereby 
hiding his helplessness and exploitation beneath a shroud of 
unsought and unfelt ennoblement. 
Joel Marks
17
© Between the Species, 2015
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 18, Issue 1
Value. Yet another term that lends itself to a fatal equivo-
cation, “value” (the verb) can mean appreciating the inherent 
worth (or “value” the noun) of something or someone, or, al-
ternatively, the instrumental worth (also “value”) of something 
or someone. For example, you may value your cat as inher-
ently worthy of your love and admiration just for being who 
and what he is, or you may value your cat instrumentally as a 
good mouser (or both). Unfortunately this distinction is lost on 
many animal users, who can – conveniently for public relations 
purposes, and even to salve their own conscience – sincerely 
affirm their “valuing” of other animals, when apparently what 
they mean is only that they can get a lot of use out of them. It 
would be nice to believe that even this would be enough to as-
sure the proper treatment of animals as if they were also valued 
in themselves. And this claim is also made by animal users, for 
example, by animal experimenters who argue that better data 
will result from happy and healthy lab animals, and by animal 
farmers who argue that better (tastier and healthier and safer) 
food will result from happy and healthy farm animals. But in 
this not-best of all possible worlds, such correlations cannot 
always be assumed, and even if correct are not always imple-
mented, and even if implemented, hardly ever go far enough. 
An example of the latter is the simple truth that, in order to ful-
fil the promise of their instrumental value, almost all of these 
animals are killed in their youth (Patrick-Goudreau 2014).
Veterinarian. In the popular mind a veterinarian is a person 
who values animals for their own sake and dedicates his or her 
professional life to promoting their health and welfare. But this 
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Being admitted to the profession of veterinary medi-
cine, I solemnly swear to use my scientific knowledge 
and skills for the benefit of society through the protec-
tion of animal health and welfare, the prevention and 
relief of animal suffering, the conservation of animal 
resources, the promotion of public health, and the ad-
vancement of medical knowledge. (AVMA 2010; my 
emphasis)
A careful reading of that passage reveals that the way in 
which animals are professionally valued by veterinarians is 
purely instrumentally. (Cf. HEALTH, VALUE, and WEL-
FARE.) This is underlined by the further elaboration of the 
Oath in the AVMA Animal Welfare Principles, with pride of 
place going to this one:
The responsible use of animals for human purposes, 
such as companionship, food, fiber, recreation, work, 
education, exhibition, and research conducted for the 
benefit of both humans and animals, is consistent with 
the Veterinarian’s Oath. (AVMA 2012)
None of this should come as a surprise if one simply reflects 
on one’s naïve assumption about the nature of the veterinary 
profession. In the simplest terms: Although a veterinarian’s pa-
tient is an animal, a veterinarian’s client is a human being, who 
pays the bills. Veterinary medicine did not come into existence 
as a charity or a welfare movement; the very word “veterinary” 
is derived from a word for draft animal or beast of burden. 
The profession is clearly premised on the “use” of animals, as 
the first Principle indicates; furthermore the profession con-
ceives animals as “resources,” as the Oath itself states. (This 
point was made even more explicitly by the earlier use of the 
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term “livestock resources” where the Oath now says “animal 
resources.”) Question: What percentage of veterinarians are 
vegetarians? Although the motivations of individual veteri-
narians obviously vary, with more and more entering the field 
to minister to the needs of companion animals and the clients 
who love them, the fact remains that the veterinary profession 
is the great enabler of animal exploitation (Marks 2011b). If 
the American Veterinary Medical Association were to declare 
its opposition to animal agriculture, animal experimentation, 
animal circuses, zoos, breeding, etc., most of these operations 
would be shut down overnight.
Welfare. This is a key term that is commonly employed by 
animal users in concert with “HUMANE” (q.v.). But, as al-
ways, everything depends on how the term is defined. Thus, 
a schema dubbed “The Five Freedoms” has established itself 
as a touchstone of animal welfare worldwide. Originally con-
ceived by the Brambell Commission in the UK in 1965 and 
simply summarized as the freedom to “stand up, lie down, 
turn around, groom themselves and stretch their limbs,” these 
were subsequently codified by the UK’s Farm Animal Welfare 
Council as follows:
Freedom from hunger and thirst, by ready access to 
water and a diet to maintain health and vigour.
Freedom from discomfort, by providing an appropri-
ate environment.
Freedom from pain, injury and disease, by preven-
tion or rapid diagnosis and treatment.
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Freedom to express normal behaviour, by providing 
sufficient space, proper facilities and appropriate com-
pany of the animal’s own kind.
Freedom from fear and distress, by ensuring con-
ditions and treatment which avoid mental suffering. 
(FAWC 2009) 
Conspicuously absent is the freedom to go on living! But of 
course how could such a freedom be granted in the context of 
animal agriculture, etc.? Hence again we see the tail wagging 
the dog, in this case, our desired use of animals partially deter-
mining what constitutes their welfare. As previously noted (see 
DEATH), some thinkers have gone so far as to question wheth-
er death per se has any moral significance for most nonhuman 
animals; but this position certainly has its objectors – see e.g. 
Simmons (2009) and Yeates (2010). The “Five Freedoms” sche-
ma seems arbitrary from an ethical standpoint and obviously 
subservient to strictly human interests. (Not to mention that 
they are honored largely in the breach, as is indicated by this 
proviso: “These freedoms define ideal states rather than stan-
dards for acceptable welfare.”) This is indicative of the funda-
mental paradox of “animal welfare,” namely that it presumes 
animal use. But animal use may simply be incompatible with 
animal welfare.
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